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TORTS RIGHT OF PRIVACY RADIO BROADCASTING Plaintiff, a
chauffeur, had been the victim of a hold-up and shooting, suffering serious
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injury. Defendant sponsored a radio broadcast in which plaintiff's name was
used dramatizing the affair. On hearing the broadcast, plaintiff sued in tort
alleging that he suffered mental anguish and physical shock which resulted in
impairing his ability to drive and caused him to be discharged from his job. Held,
defendant's motion to dismiss denied, as plaintiff had stated a cause of action
for invasion of a right of privacy. Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., (D. C. Cal.
1939) 28 F. Supp. 845.
The "right of privacy" 1 is a very recent development of tort law. Practically all the cases recognizing a person's "right to be let alone" 2 or right to
"live his life to himself" 3 have arisen in the twentieth century. The often
quoted article by Brandeis and Warren in I 890 paved the way for this new
tort concept/ but its recognition in our judicial system has been very slow .5 The
decided cases are few in number; most of the state courts have never had occasion to pass on the subject.6 Five states 7 have recognized a common-law right of
1 "The right of privacy is the right to be let alone; the right of a person to be
free from unwarranted publicity." 21 R. C. L. II96 (1918).
2 I CooLEY, ToRTs, 4th ed.,§ 135 (1932).
3 Bohlen, "Fifty Years of Torts," 50 HARV. L. REv. 725 at 731 (1937).
4 Brandeis and Warren, "The Right To Privacy," 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
5 "Fifty years ago the right which every normal and decent person feels in living
his life to himself appeared likely to be protected by a legal recognition of a right to
privacy. Unfortunately the campaign for its recognition brilliantly begun by the article
written by Justice Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law Review has almost
completely failed." Bohlen, "Fifty Years of Torts," 50 HARv. L. REV. 725 at 731
( 193 7). But Harper disagrees: "There is a constantly accumulating body of authority
for the general principle that the interest in privacy and in avoiding unnecessary and
undesired publicity of a personal and private nature is entitled to legal protection against
intended and unprivileged invasions." HARPER, ToRTS, § 277 (1933).
11 2 SocoLOw, THE LAw OF RAmo BRoADCASTING, § 457 (1939).
1 Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Missouri. The right has been invoked
to collect damages for the unauthorized use for commercial purposes of plaintiff's
photograph: Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911), noted
9 MICH. L. REv. 627 (19u); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga.
190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905), commented on 3 MICH. L. REv. 559 (1905); Kunz v.
Allen,. 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918); for the "tapping" of a telephone wire:
Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931), noted I I ORE. L. REV.
217 (.1932); for the unauthorized photographing of plaintiff's deformed child:
Basemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S. E. 194 (1930), noted 29 MICH.
L. -REv. 649 ( 193 I); for advertising a debt: Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 76 5, 299
S. W. 967 (1927), noted 26 MicH. L. REv. 682 (1928); and for the unauthorized
use of a photograph: Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., (C. C. Mass. 1894) 64 F. 280;
Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1938), noted 37
MICH. L. REv. 156 (1938). See also the concurring opinion of Maxey, J., in Waring
v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937). A Pennsylvania
common pleas court has also recognized the right in a case decided January 27, 1940,
enjoining a physician from developing or printing photographs taken of a patient
without the latter's consent. Clayman v. Bernstein, 8 U.S.L.W. 270 (1940). In Martin
v. F. I. Y. Theatre Co., IO Ohio Opinions 338 (1938), an Ohio common pleas court
indicated that the right of privacy would be recognized if the proper case arose.
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privacy, and five states have repudiated the doctrine. 8 Virginia and New York,
courts of the latter state having originally refused to accept the right, have
statutes on the question. 9 In the principal case the federal court, following the
principle of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 10 adopts the rule laid down by the
California court in Melvin v. Reid. 11 The judgment in that case was based on a
clause of the state constitution guaranteeing the inalienable right to pursue and
obtain happiness.12 The California court intimated that, in the absence of any
constitutional provision, they would have been reluctant to recognize a right of
privacy, 18 Courts are hesitant to extend liability further into the field of injury
to personal feelings. The law of tort originally protected only property rights
and physical injuries to the person. It has but slowly evolved safeguards for the
protection of the feelings and peace of mind.14 Objection has been made to the
right of privacy because it is a very personal thing, depending on a person's individual reactions and sensibilities, which makes the determination of damages
tenuous and uncertain, and opens the door to fraudulent claims. 15 Moreover,
8 Michigan, New York, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. The right
of privacy has been denied as a basis for recovery for the unauthorized use of plaintiff's
deceased husband's name and picture on a brand of cigars: Atkinson v. John E. Doherty
& Co., IZI Mich. 372, So N. W. 285 (1899); for the unauthorized publication of a
photograph for commercial gain: Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R. I. 13, 73 A. 97
(1909), noted 8 M1cH. L. REv. 222 (1910); Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64
Wash. 691, 117 P. 594 (1911), noted IO M1cH., L. REv. 335 (1912); Roberson
v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 l'f. E. 442 (1902). This last
decision aroused such a furor that the legislature enacted a statute dealing with the
situation. See note 9, infra. Damages have also been refused 'for the spreading of handbills advertising the sale of plaintiff's debt: Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel Co.,
222 Wis. 512, 269 N. W. 295 (1936), noted 36 M1cH. L. REv. 326 (1937).
9 "A person, firm, or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait, or picture of any living person without having
first obtained the written consent of such person .•• is guilty of misdemeanor." N. Y.
Consol. Laws (1909), c. 14, "Civil Rights Law," § 50. See note in 8 A1R L. REv.
233 (1937) which discusses the right of privacy in relation to the New York statute.
Virginia has a statute substantially the same as the one in New York. Va. Code (1930),
§ 5782.
10 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
11 II2 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). Recovery was allowed for the unauthorized use of plaintiff's name and incidents of her life in a motion picture.
12 "All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."
Cal. Constitution (1879), art. 1, § I.
18 It is interesting to note that Wisconsin has a constitutional provision (art. I,
§ I) similar to the one in California, yet the Wisconsin court has refused to recognize
either a common-law right of privacy or any right arising because of the constitutional
provision. See note 8, supra.
14 Brandeis and Warren, "The Right to Privacy," 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 at 220
( l 890); Prosser, "Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort," 3 7 M1cH.
L. REV. 874 (1939) ;"I STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906).
15 Pound, "Interests of Personality," 28 HARV. L. REv. 343 ( 1915); Farage,
"Mental Distress as an Independent Basis for Recovery," 40 D1cK1NSON L. REV. I
(1935); Goodrich, "Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage," 20 M1cH. L. REv,
-4-97 (1922).
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the constitutional guaranty of free speech and press as well as a general public
interest in news itself are obstacles in the path of a recognition of the right. As
a practical matter, the concept cannot be carried so far as to place the individual
in constant fear that his every act might render him liable for offending the
tender sensibility of another.16 Nevertheless, a point is reached where the Erying
into another's private affairs and the "appropriation of his personality" 17 is so
culpable that it should be considered a legal wrong.18 The law in this field is
too unsettled to state any rule as to its limits, but it would seem that the use
of plaintiff's name and unfortunate history as commercial entertainment should
be recognized as a tort. The result in the principal case, although sound, might
well have been based on a common-law right of privacy.19

Bohlen, "Fifty Years of Torts," 50 HARV. L. REv. 725 at 733 (1937).
Green, "Right of Privacy," 27 ILL. L. REv. 237 (1932).
18 Brandeis and Warren, "Right to Privacy," 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890);
29 MxcH. L. REv. 649 (1931); 43 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1929).
19 See note in 88 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 374 (1940) approving the decision in the
principal case. The case has also been noted in 14 UNIV. CxN. L. REv. 197 (1940);
25 lowA L. REV. 387 (1940).
16
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